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In this paper, we present evidence of the likely impact of cigarette tax
hikes on consumers, governments, and producers. We show that 100
percent of a tax hike is passed onto consumers in the form of higher prices.
Using both state and individual-level data, we find a cigarette demand
elasticity of 0.30 to 0.50, with long-term elasticities 1.75 times the
short-term values. We demonstrate that cigarette taxes have become
much more regressive over time as smoking rates among the highest
income groups have fallen sharply. One reason for this drop is the large
decline in smoking rates for the most educated. Given their ability to shift
tax increases onto consumers, tobacco companies bear little of the burden
of a tax. We estimate that for every $1 raised in tax revenues, cigarette
companies lose only 8 cents in before-tax profits. Using daily stock prices,
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we conduct an event study examining how new information about litiga-
tion and settlement of state Medicaid cases against cigarette manufactur-
ers changed the value of the firm. Events that increased the plaintiffs'
chances in state Medicaid cases had a statistically significant negative
impact on firm value while movements toward settlement greatly in-
creased stock prices. Finally, we consider the external costs of smoking.
Although some argue that current tax revenues exceed the external costs
of smoking, these estimates typically exclude the costs of maternal smok-
ing. We show that the costs of maternal smoking range from $0.42$0.72
per pack which makes the question of whether these costs should be
considered external critical in any cost-benefit analysis.
1. INTRODUCTION
On May 23, 1994, the attorney general's office of the state of Mississippi
filed a lawsuit against tobacco manufacturers, wholesalers, trade associa-
tions, and industry public-relations consultants seeking reimbursement
for the costs associated with treating smoking-related illness and disease
in state medical programs. At the time, the Mississippi lawsuit gener-
ated little attention. The day after the suit was filed, the Wall Street
Journal covered the story on page A2, the New York Times covered it on
page Al2, and the Washington Post contained no mention of the story. In
fact, less attention was paid to the potential outcome of the Mississippi
lawsuit than to the fact that Governor Kirk Fordice, a Republican, was
locked in a legal battle with the Attorney General Michael Moore, a
Democrat, over the attorney general's authority to file a suit over the
governor's objections.
The lack of attention to the Mississippi case in the spring of 1994 is in
stark contrast to the monumental changes that have occurred in the
political landscape since then. A total of 40 other states have filed suits
similar to the Mississippi one. In response to the mounting legal uncer-
tainty, a tobacco-industry settlement (hereafter referred to as the Settle-
ment) was reached between the states' attorneys general and the tobacco
manufacturers requiring the defendants to pay an estimated $368 bfflion
to states over a 25-year period.1 The Settlement was expected to raise
cigarette prices by about 60 cents per pack after 5 years (Federal Trade
Commission, 1997; Congressional Budget Office, 1998). The structure of
the Settlement required the federal government to pass legislation limit-
ing liability of cigarette manufacturers, granting the Food and Drug
1The text of the Settlement can be found at the State Tobacco Information Center Web
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Administration (FDA) authority to regulate cigarettes, and regulating
the practices of cigarette manufacturers who were not parties of the
Settlement. These aspects of the Settlement prompted the federal gov-
ernment to become more involved in constructing tobacco legislation. In
lieu of the Settlement, President Clinton proposed federal cigarette taxes
be raised by $1.50 per pack, primarily to decrease the number of young
smokers. Then, in more sweeping legislation, Senator McCain (R-AZ)
proposed cigarette manufacturers pay an estimated $564 billion in fines
over 25 years.2 Further, the McCain bifi contained less generous liability
protection than what had been agreed to in the Settlement. In the end,
neither the Settlement nor the McCain bifi was enacted. However, the
mere fact that the federal government was considering policies that
would raise the price of cigarettes by $1.50 per pack is a historic change.
These legal and legislative events have brought attention to economic
research concerning the likely impacts of changes in tobacco excise taxes.
In contrast to many other proposed policies, the work of economists was
prominently featured in debates concerning tobacco legislation.3 The
discussions about the likely impact of tax increases on prices and de-
mand in general, and teen smoking in particular, have relied heavily on
the work of economists. In addition, economic research has been cited in
many of the discussions regarding the external costs of smoking, the
perceptions of the risks of smoking, and the regressivity of excise taxes.
In this paper, we present evidence of the likely impacts of cigarette
excise-tax increases. Much of what we present is generic to any type of
tax change; however, some of it is particular to proposals such as the
Settlement. The paper has a simple structure in that we discuss how tax
hikes impact consumers, governments, and producers. In sections 2 and
3, we provide some basic background information on the cigarette indus-
try and a short description of recent tobacco control policies. In section 4,
we provide a detailed analysis of the likely impact of tax hikes on the
demand for cigarettes. We first outline how taxes affect price. We demon-
strate that, consistent with other studies, producers pass 100 percent of a
tax increase onto consumers in the form of higher prices. We then dis-
cuss the likely impact of higher taxes on consumption. In contrast to
some other papers, we choose not to review the large number of ciga-
rette demand studies. Instead, we establish some qualities we would
2The text of the McCain bill, S.1415, can be found in the Thomas Legislative Information
page on the Web, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas2.html.
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prefer to see in these estimates and use them as guidelines when we
construct demand estimates using aggregate and individual level data.
The short-term demand elasticity results we find are consistent across
samples, about 0.30 to 0.50, with half of the demand change brought
about by a reduction in the number of smokers. Since many major to-
bacco control programs would generate non-marginal changes in prices,
we also consider the long-term impacts of tax hikes. Our results show
long-term elasticities are 1.75 times the short-term values, consistent
with other studies. More importantly, our regression-based estimates of
demand elasticities, which are based on small year-to-year variations in
taxes, are very similar to values we construct using data for ordy four
large state tax increases in the 1990s. These results suggest we can use
regression-based estimates when discussing large tax hikes. We also
discuss results from other studies that use methodology similar to the
one we outline in the paper.
In section 5, we examine the impact of tax hikes on government reve-
nues. Since taxes are imposed at all levels of government, one conse-
quence of a federal tax hike is to diminish state revenues. In this section,
we estimate the extent of the trade-off, using the elasticity-of-demand
estimates produced in the previous section. We also consider the re-
gressivity of cigarette excise taxes. Using a time series of individual
smoking rates by income quartiles since 1976, we demonstrate that smok-
ing rates among the highest income groups has fallen sharply over time.
One reason for this drop is the large decline in smoking rates for the
most educated. In the most recent years, we show that the amount of
taxes paid decreases monotonically as we move up through the income
distribution. Some of the regressivity of taxes is mitigated by the fact that
only low-income smokers appear to be sensitive to tax hikes.
In section 6, we examine how taxes may affect cigarette manufactur-
ers. Given their ability to shift tax increases onto consumers, tobacco
companies bear little of the burden of a tax. We estimate that for every $1
raised in tax revenues, cigarette companies lose only 8 cents in before-
tax profits. When viewed in this light, we have a better understanding of
why cigarette manufacturers agreed to the Settlement. The Settlement
was expected to raise billions of dollars in revenues, but cost the tobacco
companies only $1 billion per year in pre-tax profits. The cost to compa-
nies may be more than offset by the new liability protection that was part
of the Settlement, which could be worth a substantial amount. Using
daily stock prices from January 1, 1993 to June 30, 1998, we conduct an
event study examining how new information about litigation and settle-
ment changed the value of cigarette manufacturers. Some results are not
surprisingevents that increased the plaintiffs' chances in state Medic-Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking5
aid cases had a statistically significant negative impact on firm value.
However, movements toward settlement of the outstanding cases
greatly increased stock prices. We then show cumulative returns for
cigarette manufacturers relative to the S&P 500 fell considerably as the
prospects for the Settlement collapsed.
In section 7, we consider the external costs of smoking. Although
some argue that current tax revenues exceed the external costs of smok-
ing, these estimates typically exclude one important set of costs: the
costs of maternal smoking. These costs have been excluded because
most analyses define the economic unit as the family, so that any costs of
maternal smoking are by definition not external. We show that the costs
of maternal smoking range from $0.42 to 0.72 per pack. This makes the
question whether these should be considered external critical in any
cost-benefit analysis.
2. A QUICK LOOK AT THE CIGARETTE INDUSTRY
Throughout the paper, we wifi make references to facts or events con-
cerning the cigarette industry. Rather than interject these into other
parts of the paper, we have decided instead to catalog some of them in
this section. We also hope this section wifi be useful to those who are not
familiar with the tobacco industry. As is the case throughout the paper,
coverage in this section is by no means exhaustive.
In 1996, Americans spent $49 billion on tobacco products, with the
vast majority of these dollars used to purchase 24 billion packs of ciga-
rettes. Nearly 99 percent of these cigarettes were produced by only five
domestic firms. Although the cigarette industry is still a large sector of
the economy, its size has shrunk considerably over time. Since the re-
lease of the 1964 surgeon general's report, public-health officials have
waged a massive campaign against tobacco use. This campaign has in-
cluded policies as diverse as restrictions on advertising, anti-smoking
public-service announcements, education programs, higher taxes, and
smoking bans in public places. In aggregate, these policies appear to
have achieved some measure of success. Over the past 20 years, per
capita consumption has declined considerably. In Figure 1, we graph per
capita cigarette consumption as reported by the Tobacco Institute in its
annual publication, The Tax Burden on Tobacco. Beginning in 1976, per
capita consumption declined steadily until 1993, with rates stabilizing
after then. Per capita consumption in 1993 was at the lowest level since
1943. Most of the decline in consumption is driven by a reduction in the
fraction of adults smokers. In Figure 2, we graph the fraction of adults
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FIGURE 1. Per Capita Cigarette Consumption
Survey (NHIS) and the Behavioral Risk Factors Surveillance Surveys
(BRFSS). Both of these data sets wifi be defined in more detail later. The
NHIS reports adult smoking rates over the 1976-1994 period while the
BRFSS rates are from 1985 to 1995. The NHIS numbers show smoking
rates declined steadily until 1992, with rates holding steady after. Be-
tween 1976 and 1994, smoking rates fell from 36.8 to 25.5 percent, a drop
of 30.7 percent. The drop in per capita consumption over this time was
about 38 percent, indicating the fall in smoking rates can explain the
majority of this drop.
Smoking rates vary systematically across demographic groups. Using
various sub-populations of the 1995 BRFSS survey, we calculated the
fraction of adults aged 18 and above who smoked at the time of the
survey. These rates are reported in Table 1. Whites, males, workers,
and single/divorced individuals smoke at higher rates than their coun-
terparts. Smoking rates decline monotonically with increasing educa-
tion and income, and whites smoke more than non-whites. Smoking
rates are also correlated with age, but the numbers show an interesting
pattern. Smoking rates are highest for those under 40 and decline
quickly afterwards. That is because most smokers begin regular use at
an early age and smoking cessation continues throughout smokers'
lifetimes. In Figure 3, we graph the cumulative distribution of the age
' Questions on smoking were asked as part of the 1976-1980, 1983, 1985, and 1987-1994
NHIS. Values for non-sample years are interpolated.0.40
0.20
By education:
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FIGURE 2. Smoking Participation Rates
TABLE 1






MTF -- HS Seniors
Smoking Smoking
Sample rate (%) Sample rate (%)
Full sample 23.4By family income:15k 28.8
>15k, 25k27.2
By sex: Male 25.6 >25k, 35k25.6
Female 21.5 >35k, 50k23.4
>50k 17.2
By age: 18-24 25.1 Missing 19.1
25-39 28.0
40-64 25.5By marital status:Married 20.2
65+ 11.6 Single 26.4
Widowed 15.9
By race: White 23.7 Divorced 36.7
Black 22.5
Hispanic 21.7By employment:Worker 25.5
Other 22.6status: Non-worker20.1
The sample size is 109,192. Sample weights were used in the construction of means.
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FIGURE 3. Cumulative Smoking Initiation Rates by Age
when smokers report they started smoking fairly regularly, from the
Tobacco Use Supplements (TUS) to the September 1992, January 1993,
and May 1993 Current Population Survey (CPS). Nearly 75 percent of
all adult smokers started smoking regularly by the age of 19, and over
40 percent of ever smokers started at ages 16-18. Note that contrary to
some press reports, a great many smokers pick up the habit after their
teen years.
In 1997, the average retail price of cigarettes varied from $1.46 in
Kentucky to $2.65 in the state of Washington. Most of the variation in
retail prices is due to differences in excise taxes across geographical
areas. Tobacco products are taxed at the local, state, and federal level. In
the fiscal year ending in June 30, 1997, the Tobacco Institute estimates
revenues from these three sources of tobacco taxes totaled $13.2 billion,
with $7.3 billion coming from states, $5.7 from the federal tax, and only
$0.2 billion from local sources. Overall, 96 percent of these revenues
were from cigarette taxes. The federal tax on cigarettes is currently $0.24!
pack, and state taxes range from a low of $0.025/pack in Virginia to a
high of $1.00/pack in Alaska and Hawaii. The federal tax has only been
increased three times over the past 45 years, staying at $0.08/pack from
1952 to 1983 and rising to $0.16/pack in 1983, $0.20/pack in 1991 and
$0.24/pack in 1993. In contrast, state tax changes have been frequent and
varied. Since 1975, there have been 173 nominal changes in state tax
rates, ranging from a 5-cent/pack drop to a 50-cent/pack increase. Thefrequent tax changes at the state level wifi be used below to help identify
the impacts of changing excise taxes on demand.
One of the most significant innovations in the tobacco industry has
been the introduction of generic or discount brands. First introduced in
1980 by Liggett, generic cigarettes were sold in plain packages at prices
25 to 40 percent below name-brand cigarettes. In 1984, Reynolds intro-
duced name-brand discount cigarettes, priced between generic and tradi-
tional brands. Between 1980 and the early 1990s, price hikes on branded
cigarettes outstripped the general inflation rate. As a result, the discount
market grew steadily over time, representing 36 percent of cigarettes
sold by 1993. In response to the growth of the discount market, Philip
Morris announced on April 2, 1993 (known as Marlboro Friday) that it
would drop the price on its flagship brand Marlboro by 40 cents/pack
(about a 20-percent drop in price). The price cut was quickly matched by
other cigarette manufacturers, and Philip Morris extended the price
break to other brands. Consequently, the generic market shrank to less
than 30 percent of the total. The impact of generic cigarettes on prices
can be seen in Figure 4, where we graphthe average retail price for
cigarettes over time in 1997 dollars. Note that through 1993,real retail
prices increased considerably, but since then prices have been constant.
It is interesting to note that smoking rates and aggregate consumption
stabilized at the time when the increases in real cigarette prices stopped.
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FIGURE 4. Real Per-Pack Prices and Taxes
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have been considerable changes in the nominal cigarette excise tax, the
changes have typically just replaced the value of the tax that had been
eroded by inflation. Note that the real value of taxes in 1995 is about
where it was in 1976; therefore, as the real price of cigarettes has in-
creased over time, but real tax has remained flat, the fraction of the retail
price that goes to taxes has declined.
3. A BRIEF OUTLINE OF RECENT TOBACCO
CONTROL LEGISLATION
In the past, anti-smoking programs have been adopted at all levels ofgov-
ernment. Excise taxes are imposed at the local, state, and federal level. The
federal government has banned advertising on television, and in recent
years the FDA has moved to restrict advertising aimed at teenagers. State
and local governments have adopted laws restricting smoking in public
places, whereas the federal government has proposed, but never adopted,
a complete ban on workplace smoking. In the past, these efforts have
never been coordinated. One aspect of recent tobacco control proposals,
particularly the Settlement, was the far-reaching nature of the programs.5
The Settlement was a true compromise between the states and the
tobacco industry, each side gaining only part of what it wanted when it
came to the negotiating table. Under the Settlement, the states would
gain significant payments from the industry, the governments would
obtain greater control over cigarette production and advertising. The
Settlement raised prices to pay industry fines, restricted advertising,
extended the authority to regulate nicotine to the FDA, and instituteda
near-complete ban on workplace smoking. In return, the industry would
gain important liabffity protection and some antitrust immunity.
Under the Settlement, the industry was expected to payan initial
lump-sum fee of $10 billion. Over the next 25 years, payments would
include yearly fines of set payment amounts. In the firstyear of the
agreement the industry would pay $8.5 billion, with payments increas-
ing to $15 billion per year by year 5 and remaining at that level for the
rest of the agreement. Future payments would be adjusted according to
the volume of cigarette sales in that given year, the reduction being
essentially equal to the reduction in consumption from the base year.
The agreement also required the tobacco firms to passon to consumers
the full cost of the payments. This payment structure has two obvious
effects: the Settlement legislated that consumers would pay nearly all of
For a more detailed discussion of many economic aspects of the Settlement, see the
excellent piece by Bulow and Klemperer (forthcoming).Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking I Ti
the burden of the tax, and the volume-adjusted payments are equivalent
to an excise tax on cigarettes.
An important objective of the Settlement was to reduce youth smoking.
Some of the provisions designed to achieve this goal were a ban on all
outdoor advertising of cigarette products, use of industry payments to
increase enforcement of youth tobacco access laws, and lookback penalties
that imposed significant monetary fines on the tobacco industry if under-
age tobacco use did not fall by a prescribed amount over the next 10 years.
The interest in how taxes affect teen smoking is driven primarily by two
factors. First, as we saw in Figure 3, the majority of smokers begin consum-
ing cigarettes during teen years. Second, the interest in teen smoking has
been heightened by evidence indicating that, unlike the overall smoking
rate, teen smoking remained relatively constant over the 1980s and the
early 1990s. In Figure 2, we indicate smoking rates for high-school seniors
from the Monitoring the Future Project (MTFP).6 Notice that in the NHIS
data, smoking rates declined monotonically from 1976 to 1990, and the
numbers have stabilized since that time. In contrast, the MTFP data show
a sharp drop in teen smoking rates from 1977 to 1980, steady rates from
1980 to 1992, and a massive increase in rates ever since. In fact, the MTFP
data show an 8.7-percentage-point increase in teen smoking rates over the
past five years (Monitoring the Future Project News Release, December
19,1997). For the lookback penalties, the agreement called for a 30-percent
reduction in youth smoking by the fifth year and a 60-percent reduction
by the tenth year of the agreement. For every percentage point of non-
attainment the industry would be fined an additional $80 million.7
The Settlement resolved a great deal of uncertainty for the industry.
The most important aspect of the agreement from the industry stand-
point was the liability protection. The civil liabffity provision would re-
solve all punitive damage claims for past and future conduct in suits
claiming injury or damage caused by industry conduct. In addition, the
agreement would disallow any class action suits against the industry.
Finally, the Settlement imposed an annual aggregate cap for judgements
and settlements of 33 percent of the annual industry base payment.
Some of these payments were also credited against the yearly settlement
6 The smoking rates from the NHIS and BRFSS are roughly comparable in that respon-
dents are asked to identify whether they are current smokers. Smoking rates for the MTFP
represent the fraction of high-school seniors who have smoked in the past 30 days. Daily
use rates from the MTFP show comparable trends to the 30-day use rate, but are obviously
much smaller than the numbers reported in the figure.
The lookback penalty was capped at $2 billion in any year. Estimates of youth smoking
rates will be taken from the Monitoring the Future survey designed and implemented by
the University of Michigan.12Evans, Ringel, & Stech
payments, again moving some of the cost of the settlement away from
firms and onto current smokers.
The Settlement also contained a broad antitrust exemption for the
industry. The purpose of the exemption was to enable the industry to
coordinate its effort to reduce tobacco use by children; however, the
antitrust exemption might have enabled the tobacco firms to coordinate
their activities and discuss pricing arrangements that would lead to
higher profits for the industry and higher cigarette prices for consumers
(Federal Trade Commission, 1997).
The McCain bill was similar to the Settlement in many ways. It con-
tained many of the same provisions such as industry payments, look-
back penalties, advertising restrictions, and FDA authority to regulate
tobacco products. The main difference was that the McCain bifi imposed
larger fines on the industry with less liabifity protection. The McCain
bill, just like the Settlement, called for an initial industry payment of $10
billion; however, the following yearly payments were significantly
larger. In the first year, the industry would pay $14.4 billion. The pay-
ments would increase gradually to $23.6 billion by the fifth year of the
agreement. Beyond the fifth year, the payment would be calculated
using a formula to adjust for changes in volume. The lookback penalties
were also significantly higher in the McCain bill. If youth smoking rates
did not fall to the prescribed level, the lookback penalty would be based
on the level of non-attainment. The fine was set at $80 million for each
percentage point of non-attainment between 0 and 5. If non-attainment
was greater than 5 percentage points, the fine increased to $400 million
plus $160 for each percentage point of non-attainment in excess of 5. The
maximum lookback penalty under the McCain bifi was $4 billion, two
times greater than what was agreed to in the Settlement.
Initially the McCain bill provided limited liability protection for the
industry. Unlike the Settlement, the McCain bifi permitted class action
suits against the industry. Under the bill, the state lawsuits would be
settled and there would be an annual ceiling of $6.5 billion on private
legal claims. However, even these limited liability provisions were elimi-
nated during the debate on the bifi in the Senate. The McCain bifi died in
the Senate on June 17, 1998, almost exactly one year after the historic
Settlement was announced.
4. THE IMPACT OF EXCISE-TAX INCREASES ON THE
MARKET FOR CIGARETTES
In this section, we examine the immediate impact of tobacco tax
increasesparticularly, how these tax changes alter demand for theTobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking13
product. The analysis would be more straightforward if recent tobacco
control policies proposed excise-tax hikes, but, as noted in the previous
section, the major policies considered do not actually increase taxes, but
rather impose quantity-adjusted fines. Therefore, we start the next sec-
tion by drawing parallels between the effects of taxes and fines.
4.1 What is the Effect of Taxes on Retail Prices for Cigarettes?
In textbook economic models, excise taxes are predicted to increase after-
tax prices by an amount less than the value of the tax, leading consumers
and producers to share the burden of the tax. These models typically
assume the output market is perfectly competitive.In markets without
perfect competition, the size of the price change depends critically on the
shape of the demand curve. For example, if demand in a monopolized
industry is linear, an excise tax of t dollars per unit wifi increase the price
by less than t. In contrast, if demand is isoelastic in monopolized indus-
tries, the same excise tax can increase after-tax prices by an amount
larger than t.
A number of authors have used the changes in price after tax in-
creases to test whether market power exists inthe cigarette industry
(Harris, 1987; Sumner, 1981; Sullivan, 1985; Stern, 1987; Barnett, Keeler,
and Hu, 1995; Keeler et al., 1996). These works find that nearly all and
sometimes more than 100 percent of an excise tax hike is passed on to
consumers in the form of higher retail prices. It is easy to construct a
simple econometric model that mimics the results of these earlier pa-
pers. Given the variation across states in thetiming and size of tax
changes, we can examine how average retail prices respond to changes
in state excise taxes. We use states that have changed taxes as a treat-
ment group, and compare price movements over time for this group
with those for states with no change in nominal rates. Data on average
state retail cigarette prices are taken from The Tax Burden onTobacco,
published by The Tobacco Institute (1998). Tax rates are measured as
state plus federal excise taxes on cigarettes. The prices and tax rates are
measured as of June 30 in each year. We take data from the 12-year
period 1985-1996 for all states and the District of Columbia.8 The basic
model we estimate is of the form
PRICEt = TAXtt f3 + p, + V + it (1)
8The Tobacco Institute data go back as far as 1954, but we restricted our attention to the
last 12 years for two reasons. First, that time period is most relevant for current policy
debates. Second, it closely matches the years covered in our individual-level data set that
we use below.14Evans, Ringel, & Stech
TABLE 2
OLS Estimates, Retail Price Model: Tobacco Institute Data
Standard errors in parentheses. Real prices in 1997 cents/pack. Models in columns (1) and (2) control
for state effects.
where PRICE is average retail price per pack of cigarettes in state i in
year t measured in cents, TAX is the total per pack tax (state+federal)
measured in cents, andis a random error. We estimate the model
controlling for both state () and year (vi) effects. The state effects
control for any permanent differences in prices across states. For in-
stance, some states have higher (or lower) average prices over the entire
sample. The year effects purge shocks to price that are common to all
states but may vary across years. These would include such factors as
federal tax changes, changes in wholesale prices, or changes in pricing
strategies brought about by the emergence of generic cigarettes.9 Since
we dummy out both dimensions of the data set, the coefficient on /3 is
determined solely by changes in taxes and price within in a state over
time.
We estimate two versions of the model. In model (1), we use nominal
prices and taxes, since states change nominal excise tax rates. In model
(2), we use the CPI to translate all prices and taxes into real 1997 dollars.
The results for these two models are reported in the first two columns of
Table 2. Notice the basic results reported in previous papers are repli-
cated in this simple analysis of covariance. In model (1), a nominal tax
change of 1 cent is expected to increase average retail prices by 1.01
cents. The coefficient on real tax in model (2) is 0.92. These results
Wholesale prices are set at the national level. Therefore, the year effect included in the





Net retail price in
Tennessee,
1970-1994
Independent Nominal Real Nominal Real
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Nominal/real tax 1.01 0.92
(0.04) (0.04)
Nominal/real wholesale price 1.07 0.86
(0.02) (0.04)
R2 0.972 0.933 0.989 0.963
Observations 612 612 25 25Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking 15
indicate that excise taxes are passed completely on to consumers in the
form of higher retail prices.10
These results may not be informative about the impact of recent to-
bacco control initiatives, since those policies do not rely on higher excise
taxes. As we noted in section 3, most recent tobacco control initiatives,
such as the Settlement or the McCain bill, raise prices through a
quantity-adjusted yearly fine assessed on cigarette manufacturers, who
are required to raise the price of cigarettes to pay for it. In principle, the
fine should work similarly to an excise tax, so long as the retail market is
competitive. However, in some analyses of the Settlement and the
McCain bill, industry observers speculated that because the fine is levied
early on in the distribution network, retail prices would be much higher
than predicted by the administration and other researchers. This argu-
ment suggested that at all points in the distribution chain, firms would
tack on margins to the wholesale price increase, sharply inflating the
final cost of the quantity-adjusted fines.
To test whether the quantity-adjusted fine is equivalent to an excise tax,
we examine the degree to which retail prices move as wholesale prices are
increased. Since wholesale prices are national prices, we need to retreat
from our state-panel data set to a strict time-series sample; however, a
national time series is corrupted by changing state taxes. As a compro-
mise, we use a time series relatively free from effects of state tax
changesretail prices in Tennessee. Tennessee was chosen because its
state tax was a constant 13 cents/pack over the 1970-1994 period.11 The
econometric model we estimate is rather simple: we regress retail prices,
net of state and federal taxes, on wholesale prices per pack of cigarettes.
Data on wholesale prices is taken from Table 40 of U.S. Tobacco Statistics
published by the Economic Research Service, United States Department
of Agriculture. The data are available to download from a Web site main-
tained at Cornell University (http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu). We used
the wholesale price that was in place on June 30 of the given year to best
match the retail price data from the Tobacco Institute. As with the state-
level panel data, we estimate two models: one with nominal and one with
real prices.
The results using data from Tennessee are reported in the last two
columns of Table 2. These results show that changes in wholesale prices
are translated dollar for dollar into higher retail prices. The results of
10 Manufacturers' ability to pass tax hikes onto consumers has diminished over time.
Estimating model (1) from Table 2 for the past 15, 20, and 25 years, the coefficients
(standard errors) on nominal tax are 1.05 (0.03), 1.10 (0.03), and 1.13 (0.02) respectively.
1The data set for this sample stops in 1994 because we were unable to obtain data on
wholesale prices for the most recent years.16Evans, Ringel, & Stech
these models suggest that although proposals like the Settlement and
the McCairi bifi do not directly raise excise taxes, the quantity-adjusted
fines can be treated as an excise tax. Throughout the rest of the paper,
we then examine the impact of higher excise taxes.
4.2 What Is the Impact of Higher Taxes on Demand?
There is a large literature in economics that has examined whether smok-
ing is correlated with taxes and prices. These studies vary in the type of
data (individual-level versus aggregate data), the time periods under
consideration, and the covariates of interest (taxes versus price). The
results of these studies have been reviewed in a number of sources,
including Maiming et al. (1991), Viscusi (1992), and Grossman, Sindelar,
Mullahy, and Anderson (1993), the most comprehensive review being
contained in Chaloupka and Warner (1998). Nearly every study finds
smoking declines in the face of higher taxes and/or prices, but the results
do vary across surveys. Not all demand elasticities are created equal, so
not all studies should be given equal weight. Rather than try to glean
from this literature the "correct" elasticity of demand, we instead outline
a few characteristics that we would like to see in these studies, and then
generate estimates using two different types of data: aggregate state-
level and individual-level. -
The first characteristic we would prefer to see is the use of tax, as
opposed to price, as the covariate of interest. Most demand estimates
reviewed in Chaloupka and Warner (1998) use as the covariate of inter-
est some measure of cigarette price, with prices varying across geo-
graphic areas. Intuitively, this may make sense, since the ultimate goal is
to estimate a demand elasticity. There are, however, four reasons to
prefer estimates based on variations in taxes. First, the primary reason
for geographic variation in prices is differences in tax rates; thus it seems
more direct to use this variation as the source of identification in models.
Second, taxes are measured with much less error than prices. Most price
measures are constructed using a sample of products and measure only
shelf prices, which do not reflect final prices if discount coupons are
available. These coupons are now widely used in the industry. As an-
other example, teens almost exclusively smoke name-brand cigarettes
(Centers for Disease Control, 1992). An average price that includes a
large market share for generics wifi not measure the effective price for
teens very well. Third, estimates based on tax directly identify the likely
impact of government intervention. Fourth, price is an outcome of a
market process, not an exogenous factor; therefore, the differences in
price across states may represent more than just differences in tax rates,
possibly making the coefficient on price subject to an omitted-variablesTobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking17
bias. Since tax is arguably a more exogenous factor, thecoefficient on
this variable should be less subject to such a bias.
The second characteristic we would like to see is the useof pooled
time-series cross-sectional data sets as opposed to just cross-statevaria-
tion in taxes or prices. Since excise taxes on cigarettes vary across states,
in principle we can use the cross-state variation in taxes toidentify the
models of interest. Nearly all papers that useindividual-level data re-
viewed by Chaloupka and Warner use this type of identification proce-
dure. We believe utilizing cross-state variation in taxes or price mayhave
some shortcomings. If the levelof taxation in a state is correlated with
some underlying characteristics ofthat state, then cross-sectional correla-
tions may be subject to an omitted-variables bias. Considerthe case of
three tobacco-producing states: Kentucky, North Carolina,and Virginia.
In 1997, these states ranked first, fourth, and fourteenth,respectively, in
per capita aggregate consumptionand had the three lowest state tax
rates. Can we infer from these numbers that taxesreduce smoking, or do
the same factors that lead states to have high consumptionlevels (their
tobacco-producing history) also discourage high excise taxes? In view of
such difficulties, we prefer to use pooled time-series cross-sectiondata
sets when estimating demand elasticities.The models can be thought of
as quasi-natural experiments wheresmoking levels in states before and
after tax increases (the treatment groups) are compared withchanges in
rates for states that did not change their taxes(the control). Panel data
also give us the ability to control for permanent differences across states
in consumption by using state fixed effects. These modelsallow us to
control for the possibility that there may be an underlyingcorrelation
between the average level of taxation and consumption inthe sample
that is not causal.
The difficulty with using cross-state correlations is present in cross-
country comparisons as well. Many Europeancountries have both
higher cigarette taxes and higher consumption rates than the U.S.Some
may point to this comparison asevidence that higher taxes wifi not
reduce demand. In fact, although taxes have been shown toreduce
smoking, taxes explain but a small variation in smoking rates across
jurisdictions. The real question is not whether differences in taxes can
explain differences in the levels of smoking across areas, butwhether
higher taxes in one area wifi reduce smoking.
We are not the first to make these first two points. The useof taxes as
the covariate of interest in a treatmentcontrol design isconvincingly
made by Cook and Tauchen (1982) in their analysis of liquor taxes.This is
not to say that cross-sectional models cannot generate anunbiased esti-
mate of the elasticity of demand. Rather, wethink models using cross-18Evans, Ringel, & Stech
sectional identification need to consider the problem of omitted-variables
bias much more seriously than has been done in thepast.
Finally, to be informative about current proposals, samples should
include data relevant to the time period. As the discussion in section 2
indicates, smoking levels have changed considerablyover time. The
types of people who smoke today are very different from those 30years
ago. We present evidence for this point in section 5. Consequently, even
high-quality results generated from older samplesmay not be informa-
tive about current conditions. For example, the earliest cigarette demand
study using individual-level data is that of Lewit, Coate, and Grossman
(1981). Although the structure of many subsequentpapers follows this
paper as the model, the estimates from this paper may not be informa-
tive about today's smokers, since it used data from 1966-1970.
In the next three sub-subsections, we report results generated from
models with pooled time-series/cross-sectional data sets using taxas the
covariate of interest and using the most recent data available. In section
4.2.1 below, we produce results using aggregate state-level consumption
data. In section 4.2.2, we generate tax elasticities from individual-level
data. Finally, in section 4.2.3 we summarize results from other studies that
use similar methodologies but have different data sets and/or popula-
tions. In the end, we produce a consistent set of resultsacross models and
samples.
4.2.1 Estimates Using Aggregate DataIn this sub-subsection, we use a
basic panel data set on aggregate cigarette consumption at thestate level
to estimate the effect of taxes on demand. The basic datasource for
nearly all variables is the Tobacco Institute's annual volume The Tax
Burden on Tobacco. The demand measure in these reports is theper capita
number of packs of cigarettes consumed per year, with fiscalyears end-
ing June 30. State and federal taxes are measuredas of that date as well.
To provide a long series of data by state, we use data for the 12-year
period 1985-1996 for all states and the District of Columbia. The basic
model we estimate is of the form
Q = TAX I3 + X a + /L11 + /JTIME + v + , (2)
where the dependent variable is log per capita consumption instate i in
year t, and TAXI is the tax (state + federal) in constant 1997 cents per pack.
The vector X contains a set of covariates that describe the state's adult
population. Using the annual demographic files from the March CPS,we
calculate for X the fractions of adults aged 18 andup that are Black, that
are Hispanic, that have less than 12 years, 12 years, and 13-15 years ofTobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking19
education, and that are in the 18-25, 26-39, and 40-64 age groups.We
also added the log real per capita income.12 We include state(/L11) and year
(vi) effects in the model, and, given the limited setof controls, we add
state-specific linear time trends. The fixed-effects model isintuitively
appealing in this context, since most of the variation in consumption isbe-
tween states and not within states over time. Using asimple variance de-
composition, it is easy to show that 70 percent of the variation in Q isbe-
tween states, whereas only 30 percent is within-statevariation over time.
To facilitate comparisons of our estimates with thosefrom other pa-
pers, we translate the estimatefrom equation (2) into price elasticities of
demand. Since retail prices P are a function of the taxes levied onciga-
rettes, the effect of taxes on smoking behavior can beexpressed as t3Q/c9T
= (0OJaP)(aP/8T), where oP/aT isthe change in price with respect to a




whereand q are the sample means of retail price and consumption
respectively. Using results from Table 2 above, OP/aT isapproximately 1,
and the sample means of price and per capita consumption are 175 cents
and 105 packs.
The results from the basic model are reported in the first columnof
Table 3. The coefficient on tax is 0.254 and is precisely estimated.This
coefficient translates into a demand elasticity of approximately 0.42.In a
comprehensive review of demand-elasticity estimates, Chaloupkaand
Warner (1998) note that studies using aggregate data generatedemand es-
timates clustered around 0.4. In column (4), we usereal prices instead of
tax and we estimate an elasticity of 0.294,31 percentsmaller than the esti-
mate generated using tax as the covariate. Although many papers gener-
ate estimates that are similar regardless ofwhether price or tax is used, in
this case, price and tax are not interchangeable. Part of the reason maybe
the changes in pricing patterns brought about by genericcigarettes.
The estimates of the effect of tax on consumption in column(1) of
Table 3 are generated from relatively small changes in state taxes.Dur-
ing the time period of our analysis, there were 137nominal state tax
changes, with the median and mean values 5 and 7.5 cents,respectively.
Consequently, the results in Table 3 may not be informative about the
large tax changes contained in many recent tobaccocontrol proposals.
12 The data for the real per capita income came from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Regional Accounts Data, Personal Income Tables, 1958-1996, downloadedfrom http://
www.bea.doc.gov.20Evans, Rin gel, & Stech
TABLE 3
OLS Estimates, Log Per Capita Consumption Model,
Tobacco Institute Data, 1985-1996
Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log per capita consumption. Thereare
612 observations in each model. The mean price is $1.75/pack, and the mean per capita consumption
is 105. All models include year effects, state effects, state-specific time trends, and log per capita
consumption, plus measures of the fraction of adults in three age, three education, and tworace
groups.
A number of states have initiated tax changes in the past 8years. In the
first three colunms of Table 4, we report the states with the largest four tax
changes during the early to mid-1990s. We can learn something about
how these non-marginal tax changes alter demand by viewing the states'
time-series path of log consumption against national figures. In Figures
5a-d, we graphically compare the state figures for these four experiments
with national values for per capita consumption. The vertical line in each
TABLE 4
Estimated Long-Term Cigarette Demand Elasticities for Selected States,
Tobacco Institute Data
Percentage changes are measured over a three year period. The initial point is oneyear prior to the tax
change and the end point is three years later.
Independent
variable
Coefficients (standard errors) on
Real tax Real price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Current value-0.254-0.165-0.173-0.176-0.176-0.167
(0.037) (0.040) (0.041)(0.027) (0.027)(0.029)
1-year lag -0.215-0.188 -0.027-0.031
(0.413) (0.047) (0.032) (0.032)
2-year lag -0.061 -0.017
(0.045) (0.033)
Price elasticity-0.424-0.635-0.705-0.294-0.337-0.359
(0.062) (0.074) (0.090) (0.045)(0.058) (0.072)
R2 0.975 0.977 0.977 0.975 0.975 0.976
Year of Size of tax change,
State tax hike nominal (cents) %Q %P Ed
AZ 1994 40 -18.5 22.4 -0.83
MA 1993 25 -13.3 14.3 -0.93
MI 1994 50 -20.5 23.9 -0.86
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FIGURE 5. Per Capita Consumption: (a) AZ vs. U.S.; (b) MI vs.U.S.;
(c) MA vs. U.S.; (d) NY vs. U.S.
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graph represents the year the tax hike became effective. Two things are
evident from these graphs. First, there is a noticeable drop in per capita
consumption in states after a large tax change. Second, in all four
states, consumption continues to fall relative to aggregate U.S. con-
sumption for the first few years after the tax increase. These results
suggest that the full effect of a tax change may take a few years to fully
develop.
The estimates in coluniri (1) of Table 3 are short-term elasticities in that
they only consider the contemporaneous covariance between tax and
consumption. Smoking cessation and initiation are dynamic processes
that may take time to mature. This process has been modeled formally in
a rational-addiction framework by Becker and Murphy (1988), and tests
of these models are contained in Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1991)
and Chaloupka (1991). These papers show that long-term elasticities from
rational-addiction models of cigarette demand, which include past mea-
sures of cigarette consumption, lead to a greater price responsiveness.
A long-term elasticity can be estimated in our basic regression model
by adding additional lags of tax rates into the equations. These results
are presented in columns (2) and (3) in Table 3. Notice that in column (3),
all three tax measures are statistically significant. Adding the three coeffi-
cients together and translating the sum into an elasticity, we calculate a
three-year elasticity of 0.71, which is 1.75 times the size of the contem-
poraneous elasticity from column (1). These numbers are exactly in line
with numbers in Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1991), who in a
rational-addiction framework estimate short- and long-term elasticities
of 0.40 and 0.75. We should point out that in our sample, the long-
term elasticities generated by price are only slightly larger than the
short-term estimates in column (4), again indicating that price and tax
are not interchangeable variables.
We can also generate a long-term elasticity from the four experiments
listed in Table 4 by comparing the percentage changes in price and
quantity in these four states with national trends. LetQ0be the consump-
tion in a state in the year prior to a tax change, and let Q3 be the
consumption three years later. Let Qa0 and Qa3 be corresponding num-
bers for the U.S. The percentage change in consumption in the state can
be approximated by the ratio 1n(Q3/Q0). If we assume that the consump-
tion in this state would have fallen by the national rate had a tax hike not
occurred, an estimate of the change in consumption generated by the tax
change is then %L%Q =ln(Q3/Q0) ln(Qa3/Qao). If the variable P measures
price and we assume prices at the state level would have progressed at
the national rate in the absence of a tax hike, then the impact of taxes on
price can be estimated as %L%P=ln(P53/P0) ln(Pa3/Po). We can then con-24Evans, Ringel, & Stech
struct a synthetic estimate of the long-term elasticity of demand from
these four experiments by simply constructing the ratio %zQ/%zW.
These results are reported in the final colunins of Table 4. Notice that for
three states, the long-term elasticity generated from three years of con-
sumption and price data is similar to that constructed from the regres-
sion model in Table 3.
These state-specific analyses are not without their problems. First, in
some states, the trend break in consumption in treatment states appears
before the tax increase. In other states like Massachusetts, tax revenues
were used to fund anti-smoking programs, so that the role of taxes may
be overstated. However, the results from this exercise do suggest that
the adjustment to a higher tax may take a few years, but more impor-
tantly, the elasticities generated from marginal tax changes may be used
to estimate the effects of non-marginal tax changes.
4.2.2 Estimates from Individual DataIn addition to the aggregate
state-level analysis in the previous section, we can also generate esti-
mates of the effect of taxes on cigarette consumption by using individual-
level data on smoking. To exploit the variation in tax changes within a
state over time requires that we have panels of repeated cross sections
that allow us to identify a person's state of residence. To generate esti-
mates for current policy discussions, we also need data with recent sam-
ples. The most readily available data source that has all of these qualities
is the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). BRFSS is a
stratified sample administered and supported by the Behavioral Surveil-
lance Branch (BSB), National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and
Health Promotion (NCCDPHP), and Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). The BRFSS consists of yearly state-level data on
health and risk behavior collected through random telephone surveys of
private households. Only one adult per phone interview is questioned.
Calls are made during day and evening hours, seven days a week, within
a two-week period every month. The survey questions include a combi-
nation of individual-characteristic, health-practices, and risk-behavior
questions. The number of participating states has increased from 22 in
1985 to 50 in 1995. The number of individuals included in the survey has
increased from 25,219 in 1985 to 109,192 in 1995.
Some simple descriptive statistics are reported in the first row of
Table 5. Pooling data from all years of BRFSS, we generate a sample of
812,185 observations, making this the largest sample ever used to con-
struct cigarette demand estimates for the adult population. In our sam-
ple, 24 percent of adults smoke, and smokers on average consume
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With individual-level data, we employ a "two-part" estimation proce-
dure to model cigarette demand. In the two-part framework, the deci-
sion to smoke and the intensity of smoking are modeled separately. The
two-part model has been used extensively in the health economics field
to model the demand for medical care (Manning et al., 1987), smoking
(Lewit and Coate, 1982; Lewit, Coate, and Grossman, 1981; Wasserman,
Manning, Newhouse, and Winkler, 1991; Evans and Farrelly, 1998; Ev-
ans and Ringel, forthcoming; Evans, Farrelly, and Montgomery, 1998),
and drinking (Manning, Blumberg, and Moulton, 1995).
The dependent variable used in the first part of the two-part model is a
simple indicator that equals one if the person is a current smoker. Given
the discrete nature of the dependent variable, a limited dependent-
variable model such as a probit or logit is typically estimated. Due to the
extreme number of observations and covariates in our model, we esti-
mate a linear probability model instead. In past cigarette demand mod-
els, we have found that results from a linear probability model are sur-
prisingly similar to the probit estimates (Evans and Farrelly, 1998; Evans,
Farrelly, and Montgomery, 1998; Evans and Huang, 1998); however,
there are exceptions (Evans and Ringel, forthcoming). In this case,
linear-probability estimates were very similar to probit ones. In the sec-
ond stage of the two-part model, we model the demand for cigarettes
per day among smokers; the dependent variable is entered linearly, and
the model is estimated by OLS. The set of covariates is the same in both
equations. We include state and year effects, the real tax in 1997 cents
per pack, age, age squared, sex, and categorical variables for annual
income, marital status, race, education level, work status, and race!
ethnicity. Sample weights are used in all models.
The results from the two-part model are reported in the first row of
Table 5. On the left-hand side of the table, we report results using a
contemporaneous measure of price. We also report the coefficient on
real tax from the linear probability smoking participation model and the
model of daily use among smokers. Both of these coefficients are pre-
cisely estimated. We translate the parameter values into price elasticities
using a variant of equation (3) above. The sum of the participation and
intensity-of-use elasticities is the total elasticity of demand. In the first
case, we find a total demand elasticity of 0.29, with half the elasticity
coming from a drop in participation and the other half coming from a
reduction in smoking intensity by remaining smokers. This result is
consistent with most prior estimates in the literature. Using data from
1976, Lewit and Coate (1982) estimate a total demand elasticity of 0.42;
using data from 1979, Mullahy (1985) estimates a total demand elasticity
of 0.47; Wasserman, Manning, Newhouse, and Winkler (1991) esti-Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking27
mate a value of 0.28 for 1988; and Hu et al. (1995) use data for Califor-
nia from 1985 to 1991 and estimate a total elasticity of 0.46.
Respondents in the BRFSS are surveyed throughout the year, yet our
tax measure is taken at a fixed point in time. For some people, the tax
variable may be subject to some measurement error. Smoking is also a
dynamic process, and tobacco consumption today may be a function of
current as well as recent taxes and prices. To lessen the impact of the
timing of the tax measurement on the estimates, we construct an aver-
age tax measure using data on current and previous-year taxes. The
results using the average tax measure are presented in the right-hand
panel of the table. In this model, the participation elasticity rises in value
from 0.14 to 0.26, with no comparable jump in the intensity-of-use
elasticity.
In this case, we found some difference between models with price and
models with tax. The coefficients (standard errors) on the price variable
in the first and second parts are 0.00026 (0.00005) and 0.01423
(0.0026) respectively. Unlike the results using aggregate data, the use of
price or tax is not critical in this sample. To illustrate the need to use
pooled time-series and cross-sectional data in generating the parameter
estimates, we produced results using only single cross sections of data
for all years in the sample. In these models, we remove the state effects
and add a series of regional dummy variables. The implied price elas-
ticities of demand from these models were all over the map, ranging
from 7 in 1988 to 8 in 1995, illustrating how results from single cross
sections are very sensitive to the time period of analysis.
In general, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the results in
Table 3. Our best estimate is that the elasticity of demand in the short
run is around 0.30 to 0.50, with roughly half of any demand change
coming from a drop in smoking participation. Long-term elasticities may
however be 1.75 times short-term ones.
4.2.3 Estimates from Other Studies Using Similar Methodology The
results discussed above are quite similar to another recent study that
uses individual-level data from multiple years large-scale national sur-
veys. Farrelly et al. (1998) use data from the 1976-1980, 1983, 1985, and
1987-1994 NHIS supplements that contain questions on smoking.13 His
model is similar in many respects to ours, since he controls for most of
the same covariates, including fixed-state and year effects. The one differ-
13In the public-release version of the NHIS data, only regions of the country are identified.
In order to match taxes to individuals, Farrelly et aL (1998) received state identifiers from

























































































































































































































































































































































































































6Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking29
ence between the two models is that Farrelly et al. use price instead of
tax as the covariate of interest. A summary of results from their study is
given in the first row of Table 6. Their sample includes 355,246 people,
29.3 percent of whom were smokers. The two-part demand elasticities
and the total elasticity are very close to the estimates we report in the
first half of Table 514
Although nearly every study using aggregate data or individual-level
data for adults finds cigarette consumption is responsive to higher prices
and taxes, the evidence on teen smoking is not so clear. Some studies find
youths and young adults are much more responsive to cigarette prices
than older groups, with overall price elasticities for this group ranging
from 1.45 to 0.63 and participation elasticities ranging from 1.20 to
0.588 (Lewit and Coate, 1982; Lewit, Coate, and Grossman, 1981; Gross-
man, Sindelar, Mullahy, and Anderson, 1993; Chaloupka and Wechsler,
1995; Chaloupka and Grossman, 1996). On the contrary, others find
young adults are not responsive to cigarette prices (Wasserman, Man-
ning, Newhouse, and Winkler, 1991; Chaloupka, 1991; DeCicca, Kenkel,
and Mathios, 1998).
A set of results consistent with the estimation methodology used
above is contained in the work of Evans and Huang (1998). In that paper,
the authors use group data provided by the MTFP on smoking rates by
ageracesexyearstate cells for high-school seniors who were part of
the 1977-1992 surveys. The sample consists of survey responses for over
a quarter of a million high-school seniors, making it the largest data set
on the smoking habits of teens ever used for this type of demand analy-
sis. Using data for the 1985-1992 period, Evans and Huang were able to
estimate smoking participation demand elasticities, again controlling for
state and year effects. The description statistics for their sample are
reported in the second row of Table 6. They estimate a price participation
elasticity of about 0.50, which is twice the size of the largest estimate of
the same quantity we calculate for adults using the BRFSS data.
The large elasticity and the real drop in name-brand prices can help
explain at least some of the recent increase in smoking among teens. On
Marlboro Friday in April of 1993, name-brand prices were reduced by 20
percent overnight. Recall from Figure 1 that real prices have not re-
bounded from this large drop in nominal prices and teen smoking in-
creased by 8.7 percentage points between 1992 to 1997. Since teens
smoke almost exclusively name-brand cigarettes, this drop in price is
expected to increase smoking rates by 10 percent [(-0.2)x(-0.5)]. With
Although we do not report standard errors on these elasticities, the coefficients on the
underlying parameter values are statistically significant.30Evans, Ringel, & Stech
a base smoking rate of 27.8 percent in 1992, the drop in name brand
cigarettes in 1992 is responsible for about 32 percent of the increase in
teen use.
Another paper examining the effect of taxes within a fixed-effects
framework is Evans and Ringel's (forthcoming) paper on whether higher
cigarette taxes can discourage smoking among pregnant women. This is
a particniarly interesting group to consider because smoking during preg-
nancy has been shown to decrease birth weights. Thus, tax-induced
smoking cessation should immediately improve birth outcomes. Evans
and Ringel use data on maternal smoking during pregnancy from the
Natality Detail data. These data are published annually by the National
Center for Health Statistics and contain a census of births that occurred
in the U.S. They are taken directly from birth records and contain infor-
mation regarding the newborn (including birth weight), as well as de-
tailed demographic characteristics of the mother. Most of the informa-
tion is collected at the time of the birth by the health-care provider. In
1989, the number of variables reported in the Natality Detail data was
expanded to include information such as the method of delivery, medi-
cal procedures used during delivery, and self-reports of smoking and
drinking during pregnancy. Using data on maternal smoking for over
10.5 million women who gave birth during 1989-1992, Evans and Ringel
find the smoking-participation price elasticity of demand is -0.50, but
little, if any, impact of higher taxes on the intensity of smoking among
remaining smokers. The results from this paper are summarized in the
last row of Table 6. Evans and Ringel also show that higher taxes trans-
late into better birth outcomes, with average birth weights improving in
states that raise excise taxes.
There are two potential problems with all of the estimates we discuss
above. First, some authors have noted that the effects of state taxes may
be mitigated by cross-border purchases (Baltagi and Levin, 1986; Coats,
1995). We do not believe this should dramatically change the results
outlined above. In their work on cigarette taxes and maternal smoking,
Evans and Ringel (forthcoming) used data on a pregnant woman's
county of residence to identify women who lived within a short distance
of a county in another state with a lower tax rate. In a sample of over
7 million, they did not find a statistically significant effect of border
taxes. More importantly, the addition of border tax rate had no impact
on the own-state tax coefficient. Second, if other state policies related to
tobacco are changing at the same time, our excise-tax coefficient may be
picking up the effects of those changes in regulations (Wasserman, Man-
ning, Newhouse, and Winkler, 1991; Chaloupka and Grossman, 1996).
For example, many states have adopted restrictions on workplace andTobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking31
public-area smoking, and a number of studies have demonstrated that
workplace policies do reduce smoking participation and intensity by
increasing the cost of smoking on the job.15 We believe that the available
evidence casts doubt on whether these state laws bias the tax effect.
These laws wifi only be a concern if the statutes actually reduce demand.
There is little evidence on this point. Most of the studies that have
examined how non-tax state policies affect smoking use cross-sectional
models which are subject to the criticisms that we outline above. When
authors have examined the effect of these other laws on smoking with
panels of repeated cross-sections, they have found it lacking. Farrelly
and Evans (1998) demonstrate that there is little correlation between
state laws governing workplace smoking and actual workplace policies
and no effect of these policies on smoking among workers. They suggest
that the desire on the part of firms to reduce workplace smoking swamps
any effect of the laws in increasing exposure to workplace bans. Simi-
larly, Evans and Ringel (forthcoming) demonstrate that the tax coeffi-
cient changes little when they control for numerous types of state laws
on public smoking in their basic cigarette demand models.
5. THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON PUBLIC FINANCES
Cigarettes are taxed at all levels of government, generating over $13
billion in revenues in fiscal year 1997. In this section, we examine some
issues concerning the taxation of tobacco. First, we illustrate that be-
cause taxes are levied at all levels of government, large increases in tax at
one level can greatly diminish revenues to another. Secondly, we exam-
ine questions of tax fairness.
5.1 Federal and State Tobacco Tax Revenues
Because the elasticity of demand for cigarettes is low, excise-tax hikes are
a ready source of revenue for all levels of government. Higher cigarette
taxes have been proposed as a revenue source for education, reductions
in property taxes, the elimination of the marriage penalty, universal
health insurance, and cleanup of Puget Sound.
As a permanent revenue source, excise taxes are an imperfect tax
instrument. In general, inflation tends to erode the base of any excise
tax. As we demonstrated in Figure 4, although there have been numer-
ous increases in the state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes, their real
value has remained constant over the past 30 years. The nominal value
of revenues is also subject to the time path of consumption: as aggregate
See Evans, Farrelly, and Montgomery (1998) for a review.32Evans, Rin gel, & Stech
smoking rates decline, so too wifi the revenues from any particular tax.
These two effects can be substantial. For example, aggregate sales of
cigarettes fell by 26 percent from 1981 to 1997 while the consumer price
index increased by 80 percent. These two limitations of excise taxes are
only addressed at the state and federal level by subsequent hikes in the
tax rates. In contrast, both the Settlement and the McCain bifi had built-
in inflation adjustment for the fee schedule. Interestingly, both the Settle-
ment and the later years of the McCain bifi also adjusted down fee
payments as aggregate consumption declined. These adjustments had
the effect of generating certainty in the real per-pack tax change but
generating uncertainty in the level of revenues.
Because cigarette taxes are levied by all levels of government, tax hikes
by one level of government will, by construction, reduce revenues to
another by reducing the level of consumption. Estimates of the aggre-
gate trade-off can be obtained by using the results given above. To make
things simple, suppose excise taxes are levied at two levels of govern-
ment at the tax rates t1 and t2. Let q be the current consumption of
cigarettes in packs per year, and p be the current price. Total tax revenue
from all sources is defined as R = (t1+t2)q. If ap/t = 1 as was demon-
strated above, then the revenues gained by a hike in (say) t1 can be
shown to equal aR/at1 = q[1 + (t1 +t2)Ed/p], where q(1 + tjEd/p) is the reve-
nue gained by level 1 and qt2/p is revenue lost by level 2. Using short-
and long-term elasticities of 0.4 and 0.7 respectively, and 1997 values
for the other parameters (q = 23.9 billion packs, p = $185.4, federal and
average state tax rates of 24 and 32 cents per pack respectively), we
estimate the impact of a 50-cent tax hike on revenues for two levels of
government. The results are shown in Table 7. In the first case, we
consider that the whole tax hike is at the federal level, and in the second
case, we assume all states increase taxes by the same amount as in the
Settlement. Notice that in the short run, a federal tax hike of 50 cents will
increase federal revenues by $11.35 billion, but almost $0.8 bfflion will be
lost due to a reduction in state revenues as aggregate consumption falls
by 10.8 percent. In the long run, a 50-cent federal tax hike wifi reduce
state revenues by almost 20 percent. In the case of a uniform increase in
state taxes such as in the Settlement, the fraction of revenues lost by the
federal government wifi also equal 10.8 percent. We should also note
that this understates the total lost revenue, since sources such as sales
taxes wifi also be affected.
5.2 The Regressivity of Cigarette Taxes
One frequent objection to almost any excise tax is that it is regressive. In
his review of the progressivity of different tax regimes, Suits (1977) findsTobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking33
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The percentages and total dollar values may not be accurately constructed from numbers in the table,
due to rounding error.
excise taxes in the U.S. are the most regressive form of taxes. Cigarette
taxes are thought to be particularly regressive, since consumption actu-
ally falls with increasing income (see Table 1). The relationship between
consumption and income has changed over time as smoking rates for
individuals with higher family incomes have dropped dramatically. Us-
ing data on smoking participation from the 1976-1980, 1983, 1985, and
1987-1994 NHIS, we constructed smoking rates by within-year family
income quartiles for those aged 18 and up.16 In Figure 6, we graph these
rates over time, interpolating values for years when the NHIS did not
ask smoking questions. There was very little difference in smoking rates
across income groups in 1976. By 1994, smoking rates inthe lowest
income group had fallen by only 4.6 percentage points, while rates for
the highest income group had fallen by about 14 percentage points.
Although smoking rates vary considerably across income groups,
there is little variation in daily consumption across income categories.
16Three caveats should be mentioned. First, the family income question in the NHIS is a
categorical variable. In earlier years, there were very few categories, so the fraction of
adults in each income group may be the same. Second, our quartile measures are
individual-weighted groups of family income. The groups do not represent quartiles of
family income, but rather, quartiles of individuals based on reported family income. Third,
in each year of the NHIS, roughly 10 to 15 percent of the respondents did not answer the













Federal tax hike of $0.50/pack
Federal 5.74 11.35 198 10.88 190
States 7.31 -0.79 10.8 -1.38 18.8
Total 13.05 10.56 80.9 9.50 72.8
All states increase tax by $0.50/pack
Federal 5.74 -0.62 10.8 -1.08 18.8
States 7.31 11.18 153 10.59 145
Total 13.05 10.56 80.9 9.50 72.834Evans, Ringel, & Stech
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FIGURE 6. Smoking Rates by Family QuartilesNHIS
Consequently, the fraction of excise-tax dollars paid by each income
group can be calculated by simply examining the share of smokers across
groups. In 1976, smoking rates for the four income groups (lowest to
highest quartiles) were 36.5, 38.7, 36.6, and 35.0 percent, respectively.
The fractions of excise taxes paid by the income groups are then 24.9,
26.4, 24.9, and 23.8 percent, respectively. In 1994, the smoking rates
(percentages of tax paid) of the lowest to highest income quartile groups
are 31.8 (31.2), 26.9 (26.5), 24.0 (23.6), and 18.9 (18.6). Cigarette taxes
have become more regressive over time. By 1994, cigarette taxes are not
just regressive in the proportion of income devoted to pay taxes, but the
absolute dollar value paid by low income groups is greater than that paid
by higher income groups.
A number of authors have questioned whether the regressivity of a tax
at a point in time is an accurate measure of the lifetime burden of the tax
(Pechman, 1985; Poterba, 1989, 1991; Lyon and Schwab, 1995). In the
case of cigarettes, a life-cycle perspective is expected to alter the lifetime
incidence for two reasons. First, smoking rates are highest amongyoun-
ger adults (see Table 1), a group typically with lower income. Compari-
son of smoking rates across income classes may be comparing people at
very different points in their life. Second, as Poterba (1989, 1991) notes,
there should be less variation in lifetime income than in annual house-
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FIGURE 7. Smoking Rates by Education GroupsNHIS
through the income distribution over time, then the lifetime tax burden
may be very different from cross-sectional measures.
The evidence would seem to suggest that even in a life-cycle perspec-
tive cigarette taxes would still be considered regressive. Part of the
rapid decline in smoking for the highest income groups has been gener-
ated by a sharp drop in smoking among those with higher levels of
education. In Figure 7, we graph the time series in smoking rates for
four education groups: (1) less than a high-school degree; (2) a high-
school degree, (3) some college, and (4) a college degree. Note that
smoking rates for those in the lowest two education groups have fallen
by only 7 and 8 percentage points respectively, whereas those in the top
two groups have fallen by about 13 percentage points each. Since educa-
tion is the best single predictor of both smoking and income, it seems
unlikely that measuring the regressivity of cigarette excise taxes from a
life-cycle perspective wifi significantly alter the conclusions drawn from
cross-sectional measures.
The fact that smoking rates vary considerably across age groups should
also not alter the conclusions about regressivity from a cross-sectional
analysis. Using data from the TUS to the 1992 and 1993 CPS, we group
respondents into 5-year age intervals (24, 25-29,30-34, ...,75), and
for each group we construct group-specific estimates of income quartiles.
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FIGURE 8. Smoking Rates by Income Quartiles and Agei 992-1993
CPS TIIS
that for all age groups, smoking rates decline monotonically as family
income quartiles rise.
Some of the regressivity of higher cigarette taxes wifi be mitigated by
the fact that higher-income individuals are less responsive to tax
changes than others. In the lower half of Table 5, we report demand
estimates for three groups: (1) those with missing family income,17 (2)
those in the lower half with respect to reported family income, and (3)
those in the upper half.'8 The total demand elasticity for the income-
missing group was 0.652: 0.322 for the lower half and 0.170 for the
upper half.
One might question whether we should be concerned about the regres-
sive nature of cigarette excise taxes. Whether the regressivity of tobacco
17Although those with missing family income have the lowest smoking rates, their demo-
graphic characteristics are most similar to those with low incomes. For example, those who
do not report family income have fewer years of education and are less likely to be white
than those who respond to the income question. Consequently, we view those who do not
report income as most likely to be a "low" income group.
18The BRFSS survey has broad income categories(<$10,000, $10,000-15,000, ...).We
lumped the broad income categories into three main income groups: group 1 ( $25,000),
group 2 ($25,000), and group 3 (income missing). In the earlier years of the BRFSS data 50
percent of the observations were within group 1. This percentage dropped over time. To
allow for consistent comparisons by income group, we systematically placed individuals in
group 1 to maintain 50 percent within the lowest income group.Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking37
taxes is problematic depends in part on the goal of the tax. If tobacco
taxes are levied to raise general revenues, then regressivity is a legiti-
mate concern. However, if cigarette taxes are used to internalize exter-
nalities or compensate for inaccurate risk perceptions, then those who
smoke the most should pay the most in cigarette taxes. Unfortunately, it
is not always clear why some jurisdictions raise cigarette taxes.
6. THE IMPACT OF COMPREHENSIVE TOBACCO
LEGISLATION ON TOBACCO COMPANIES
As we demonstrated above, higher excise taxes are passed along, dollar
for dollar, to consumers in the form of higher prices. The impact on
tobacco companies of any tax increase is then greatly diminished as
consumers bear the majority of the burden of new taxes. As a result, the
ratio of lost profits to revenue raised is quite small. We calculate that for
every dollar raised in additional tax revenue, cigarette manufacturers
lose only 8 cents in pre-tax profits.19
As the FTC (1997) notes, there is also the possibility that firms could
benefit from tax increases if they can pass more than 100 percent of the
tax hike onto consumers. Given the existing base of smokers and the
large gap between price and marginal cost in the cigarette industry,
manufacturers only need to raise the price slightly. We calculate that
given a $1 hike in taxes, cigarette manufacturers need only raise prices
by $1.07 in order to keep profits at pre-tax levels.20
Given the low ratio of lost profits to tax revenues, Bulow and Klemperer
(1998) note it is not surprising tobacco firms supported the Settlement.
The FTC estimates that by the fifth year, the Settlement would have raised
cigarette prices by $0.62/pack, which, given an elasticity of 0.40, would
19 Define a firm's profit function as r = pq - C(q), where C(q) is the cost curve. Roberts and
Samuelson (1988) find that production in the cigarette industry can be described by a
constant-returns-to-scale technology, so C(q) can be replaced by cq, where c is marginal cost.
Treating an excise tax as an increase in marginal costs, an excise tax will not change the value
of p - c if firms pass 100 percent of a tax hike onto consumers. Consequently, ar/a tin this
industry can be shown to equal q[(p - c)/p}ed. Noting that the change in tax revenues is
defined as q(1 + (t/p)ea), the ratio of lost profits to taxes raised is simply ed(p - c)/pI/[1 + (t/
p)ed]. Bulow and Klemperer (1998) show the marginal before-tax profit per pack of cigarettes
is $0.33. In 1997, the average tax and price per pack was $1.85 and the average tax per pack
was $0.56. Assuming a short-term elasticity of demand of 0.40, the numbers indicate that
for every dollar raised by higher excise taxes, the cigarette manufacturers lose only 8 cents in
pre-tax profits.
20 Using the notation from the previous footnote, when taxes change the price/cost mar-
gin, 81T/3t can be shown to equal q[ä(p - c)/8t + ed(p - c)/p}, so if 3(p - c)/St> - ed(p - c)/
p then 3ir/3t> 0. Using p - c = $0.33, p = $1.85, and ed = 0.4, we have 3(p - c)/8t > 0.07
for äir/St> 0.38Evans, Ringel, & Stech
raise total revenues by a little over $13 billion, costing the cigarette manu-
facturers $1.04 bfflion in lost profit (0.08X13). Under the Settlement, it
would only cost cigarette manufacturers $1 billion per year to shed hun-
dreds of billions of dollars of potential liability.
Given the liability protection in the Settlement, it is easy to verify that
the Settlement would have been beneficial for the industry. In this sec-
tion, we use an events study to examine how movements towards and
away from settlements altered the value of firms. Modern finance theory
suggests a firm's stock market value represents investors' predictions of
the firm's present discounted value of future profits. Investors are ra-
tional agents and use all available information when making their fore-
casts. The arrival of new information may alter the investors predictions
and thus the firm's stock market value.21 An events study can be struc-
tured in a number of ways; we have chosen to follow the methodology
outlined in Mullin, Mullin, and Mum(1995).
We have identified 22 events, starting with the filing of the first state
suit against the tobacco industry in Mississippi in May of 1994, that
might have led investors to alter their predictions regarding the future
profits of the tobacco industry. One difficulty in conducting an events
study is determining when information about a particular event was
received by investors. For instance, the Settlement was announced on
June 20, 1997; however, reports that talks between the industry and the
state attorneys general were underway can be found as early as April 16,
1997. Consequently, we wifi consider several dates for those events for
which a single date is not applicable. In most cases, the various dates
include the date of the earliest newspaper report that an event wifi occur
and the actual date of occurrence. In the statistical model, each date is
considered an individual event. Thus, something like the Settlement wifi
have several events associated with it. A brief description of each event
is included in Table 8.
We use daily stock return data to estimate the following model:
= a1 + 13i+ D + it, (4)
where R is the daily return to security i on day t, Ris the return on the
S&P 500 Composite Index on day t, D is a dummy variable that is equal
to one if event s occurred on day t, andis a random error. This model
is estimated for six companies using data from 1993 through June 30,
21For examples of events studies in the economics literature see Brown arid Warner (1985),
Schipper, Thompson, and Weil (1987), Lyon (1989), Mullin, Mullin, and Mullin (1995), and
Card and Krueger (1995).Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking39
1998. The companies included in the study are Philip Morris, RJR
Nabisco, BAT Industries (the parent company of Brown & Williamson),
Loews (the parent company of Lorillard), U.S. Tobacco, and Brooke
Group Ltd. (the parent company of Liggett). While U.S. Tobacco does
not produce cigarettes, it does produce chewing tobacco and moist snuff
and was named as a defendant in the state suits. Thus, we decided to
include it in the study.
The daily stock return data for 1993 through 1997 were obtained from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The CRSP data con-
tain a daily return measure adjusted for dividend payments and stock
splits. We did not have access to the 1998 CRSP data; therefore, the 1998
data on daily security prices were downloaded from the Dreyfus Broker-
age Services, Inc. Web site (hllp://www.tradepbs.com). To calculate an
adjusted daily return measure that would be consistent with the CRSP
data, we obtained information from Standard & Poor's Annual Dividend
Record, 1998 on dividend payments and stock splits.
If there is new information provided by an event that leads investors
to revise their forecasts of the value of a tobacco firm, it wifi be reflected
in the estimate of the coefficient on the event indicator variable, If
the parameter estimate is positive, it indicates the event was beneficial
to the firm and increased its stock market value. Since we hypothesize
that the Settlement was good for industry, we would expect to find
positive estimates offor events that increased the probability of the
Settlement.
Since there may be idiosyncratic factors that affect investors' valuation
of a particular company, it is useful to average these out by calculating a
tobacco-industry response to the different events. The industry response
to an event can be measured as the mean value of the estimated coeffi-
cients on that event indicator variable across the firms in the industry. In
our calculations, the response of Brooke Group Ltd. is excluded from the
industry average, since it settled with the attorneys general and would
likely respond differently to many of the litigation events.
The results of the events study are summarized in Table 8. The esti-
mates indicate Philip Morris investors are responsive to certain types of
new information. Nine of the twenty-one events have a significant im-
pact on Philip Morris daily stock returns. The first announcement that
settlement talks were taking place between the industry and the state
attorneys general appears to have the largest impact on daily returns,
leading to approximately a 10-percentage-point increase. This result indi-
cates investors viewed the Settlement as having a positive impact on the
firms' future profits. Interestingly, the actual announcement of the Settle-
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actual announcement was made, investors did not know what its scope
and cost would be. The dip in daily returns on June 20, 1997 is likely the
effect of investors adjusting and revising their forecasts based on the
information that the face value of the Settlement approached $35 billion.
The estimates for the industry are reported in the sixth column of
Table 8. Ten of the twenty-one events are found to have a significant
impact on daily returns. Three of these events have a positive impact on
investors' forecasts of future profitability. The first announcement that
settlement talks were underway between the industry and the states is
again the event with the largest effect. The two other positive events for
the industry are related to the transfer of new information that settle-
ment talks were nearing a resolution, first in the case of the Settlement
and later in the case of the Minnesota trial.
Seven of the ten significant events had a negative impact on daily
returns. The event with the largest negative impact came early on in the
current wave of tobacco litigation. Though there was little effect on
tobacco stocks when Mississippi first brought suit in May of 1994, there
was a large impact in March of 1997 when investors saw the case was
actually going forward. Similarly, there was a large negative reaction to
the start of jury selection in the Minnesota trial in January of 1998.
Another event that had a significant negative impact on industry daily
returns was when Brooke Group Ltd. settled with twenty-two attorneys
general in March of 1997. As part of the settlement agreement, Brooke
Group Ltd. agreed to cooperate fully with the attorneys general and to
turn over documents that had previously been withheld under attorney
client privilege. Investors clearly feared Brooke Group Ltd.'s coopera-
tion and the newly released documents would be detrimental to the
tobacco industry's case.
The results of this events study support the hypothesis that the Settle-
ment was seen by investors as good for the tobacco industry. Those
events which appeared to bring a settlement closer were viewed as
positive, while those events which appeared to move the industry and
the attorneys general further apart had a negative impact on the firm's
stock market value. In contrast, none of the federal initiatives (the
McCain bifi or President Clinton's tax proposal) registered with the mar-
ket, indicating that perhaps the investors did not view these proposals
as possible from the start.
While the events-study methodology allows us to investigate the impact
of specific events, it does not provide a broad picture of what was happen-
ing to stock prices in the tobacco industry during this period. To obtain a
broad picture, we look at how tobacco company stocks have performed






















FIGURE 9. Cumulative Returns Relative to S&P 500: (top) Philip Mor-
ris and RJR Nabisco; (bottom) Brooke Group Ltd.
cumulative daily return for individual companies from January 1, 1993 and
subtract from this the cumulative return for the S&P 500. In Figure 9a, we
graph the cumulative returns for Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco.Philip
Results for other tobacco manufacturers were similar. We focus on these two firms
because their sales represent over 70 percent of industry sales.44Evans, Ringel, & Stech
Morris has underperformed relative to the S&P 500 since early in 1993;
however, it was not until 1997 that the magnitude of the difference in
cumulative returns rose sharply. Although it is not as pronounced, a
similar pattern can be seen for RJR Nabisco. Early in 1997 Philip Morris
appeared to be rebounding and moving closer to the S&P 500 in returns.
This coincides with the early stages of the Settlement. The first announce-
ment that talks were underway and a settlement was possible was in
April of 1997. This upturn for Philip Morris relative to the S&P 500
supports the hypothesis that the Settlement was viewed as a positive
step for the tobacco industry. The dramatic dropoff that took place in the
latter part of 1997 and the early part of 1998 might indicate that investors
revised their forecasts of future profitability as it became more and more
likely that the Settlement would not be implemented, and more restric-
tive and costly federal legislation might be passed.
The one tobacco company that does not follow the same pattern as
Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco is Brooke Group Ltd. (the parent com-
pany of Liggett), whose cumulative returns relative to the S&P 500 are
graphed in Figure 9b. In May of 1996, Brooke Group Ltd. settled tobacco
lawsuits with four state attorneys general. A year later, it settled with
twenty-two more states. As seen in Figure 9b, settling the lawsuits ap-
pears to have been quite beneficial. Of the six tobacco companies that we
consider, Brooke Group Ltd. is the only one that outperforms the S&P
500 for any length of time during 1993-1998.
7. WHY TAX TOBACCO?
Until now, we have avoided the debate about whether governments
should raise the tax on tobacco. Although the answer to this question
may seem obvious to some in other academic disciplines, for some econo-
mists it is not so clear. One justification for higher cigarette taxes would
be if the external costs of smoking exceeded the revenues raised by
cigarette taxes. However, three well-publicized studies (Manning et al.,
1991; Gravelle and Zimmerman, 1994; and Viscusi, 1995) find smokers
"pay their way" and the current level of excise taxes are smaller than the
external costs of smoking. Specifically, Manning et al. conclude that in
1986 dollars, the external costs of smoking total $0.15/pack of cigarettes
whereas the states and federal government tax cigarettes an average of
$0.37/pack. An interesting comparison is also noted by Manning et al.,
who found current levels of alcohol taxes were substantially lower than
the external costs generated by alcohol use. The disparities in the results
for alcohol and cigarettes are due to two factors. First, there are thou-
sands of external deaths associated with drunk driving and violence,Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking45
that, when monetized using standard estimates of the value of a statisti-
cal life, increase the external costs of alcohol use. In contrast, Manning et
al. assumed there are no such external deaths associated with cigarette
use. The second reason why smokers "pay their way" is the so-called
death benefit from smokingsmokers die earlier than nonsmokers, re-
ducing lifetime social security payments (Shoven, Sundberg, and Bun-
ker, 1989) and lifetime health-care costs.
The results from these papers are at the least provocative and at the
most call into question whether we should be considering large tax
increases at all. However, these studies are not without their critics.
Some find it objectionable that death can be considered a "benefit." In
more pointed criticism, a number have questioned the authors' defini-
tion of external costs. Specifically, Manning et al. define the economic
unit as the household, and the effect of smoking on infants and spouses
is thus, by assumption, not an external cost. In sensitivity tests, Man-
ning et al. do consider the costs of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)
and the effect of maternal smoking on infants, but in the end, they
conclude that even adding these values into their model does not change
the basic conclusion that smokers pay their way.
The calculation of the external costs of ETS is clouded by a lack of
consensus about the risks associated with passive smoke. Manning et al.
only consider as costs an estimated 2,400 lung cancer deaths per year
attributed to second-hand smoke. Viscusi (1995) argues that these costs
are exaggerated because doseresponse curves were based on data gen-
erated when tar contents of cigarettes were much higher. However, both
studies remark that the vast majority of deaths associated with second-
hand smoke are likely exposed spouses. The discussion is complicated
further by evidence that ETS could be responsible for between 30,000
and 60,000 heart-disease deaths annually (Glantz and Parmley, 1995),
although the science on this issue has been called into question
(Steenland, Thun, Lally, and Heath, 1996). The claim that most of the
deaths due to ETS are due to in-home exposure is contradicted by the
EPA (1992), which found that over 70 percent of the exposure to ETS
occurs outside the home. In the end, we do not believe we can add much
to this debate. What appears to be lacking is a consensus on the
sciencehow many people are harmed by ETS?
We are however, much more confident that the costs of maternal smok-
ing, ignored in Gravelle and Zimmerman and in Viscusi, are larger than
reported in Manning et al. They calculate that including the costs associ-
ated with smoking-induced low-weight births increases the external costs
of smoking by about $0.16/pack in 1986 dollars or $0.22/pack in 1994
dollars. Using a simple accounting exercise, we find the costs associated46Evans, Ringel, & Stech
with maternal smoking are in fact quite large. The costs of smoking on
infants and children are concentrated in three areas. First, smoking in-
creases the chance a baby wifi be born with a low birth weight. In 1995,
7.3 percent of newborns in the U.S. had low birth weights (defined as less
than 2500 grams). Cigarette smoking has been identified as the "single
largest modifiable risk factor for low birth weight. . ." (Shiono and Behr-
man, 1995, p. 11). The surgeon general (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 1989 and 1990) concludes that maternal smoking during
pregnancy reduces birth weight by an average of 200 grams and doubles
the chance of an infant having a low birth weight. Low-birth-weight
infants face a greater risk of developmental and health problems than
other infants. Rates of cerebral palsy and other forms of brain injury are
higher in low-birth-weight infants, and these risks increase as birth
weight declines. By school age, children born with low birth weights are
more likely to have learning disabilities, attention disorders, and develop-
mental impairments than normal-weight children (Shiono and Behrman,
1995). Low-birth-weight infants also have higher rates of deafness, blind-
ness, epilepsy, chronic lung disease, and infant mortality (Paneth, 1995).
Low-birth-weight infants receive much more medical attention than
other newborns. Lewit et al. (1995) calculate that of all medical-care dol-
lars spent during the first year of life, approximately 35 percent are spent
on the incremental costs of treating low-birth-weight infants. Much of
this cost is due to the longer initial hospital stays for these babies. Since
smoking increases the probability of a low birth weight, and these infants
generate much higher medical costs than a normal-birth-weight infant,
smoking is associated with higher costs of treating newborns (Oester,
Delea, and Colditz, 1988; Li, Windsor, and Hassan, 1994). External costs
associated with more low birth weights wifi then take three forms: higher
medical expenditures, higher education costs, and infant mortality.
Second, maternal smoking has been shown to significantly increase
the risk of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). SIDS strikes 4,000 U.S.
infants annually, but the rate has fallen considerably over time. Al-
though SIDS was once thought to have no known cof actors, two signifi-
cant behavior factors have been identified: the sleeping position of the
infant and maternal smoking. In a recent paper, DiFranza and Lew
(1995) review 12 major case-control studies and conclude that maternal
smoking triples the chance children wifi die of SIDS.
Finally, maternal smoking increases infant mortality and fetal loss.
Infant mortality is tied closely to the lower birth weights of children born
to smokers. In a review of 13 epidemiological studies, DiFranza and Lew
find smoking increases, by about 20 percent, the chance of infant mortal-
ity and fetal loss.Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking47
We calculate the costs associated with these factors using a simple
accounting procedure. The procedure is similar to the auxiliary analysis
conducted by Manning et al. The results from the accounting exercise
are reported in Table 9. For this example, we make detailed calculations
for 1994. Using standard results from epidemiology, we can easily calcu-
late the fraction of cases for a particular event (e.g., low birth weight)
that can be attributed to smoking. Women who do not smoke have a
baseline probability of having a low-weight birth, and smoking elevates
this probability. The degree to which smoking increases the risk of a low-
weight birth is measured by the relative risk ratio, denoted as RR. A
relative risk ratio of 2 would mean smoking doubles the chance of a low-
weight birth. With the relative risk ratio and the fraction of women who
smoke (denoted as 5), we can calculate the fraction of cases in each birth-
weight category that can be attributed to smoking. In epidemiology, this
is typically called the population-attributable risk and is defined as (Kahn
and Sempos, 1989; Kelsey, Thompson, and Evans, 1986)
S(RR-1)
PAR -
1 + S(RR - 1).
This number times the number of low-weight births wifi give us an
estimate of the cases attributed to smoking.
The cost of treating low-birth-weight infants increases as birth weights
decline (Li, Windsor, and Hassan, 1994; Lewit et al., 1995), but maternal
smoking increases the chance of a low-weight birth (1500-2499 grams)
much more than it increases the chance of a very-low-weight birth
(<1500 grams). Therefore, we provide separate estimates of how smok-
ing increases the probability a baby is born into each low-birth-weight
category and of the costs of treating these children.
In the first two lines of Table 9, we calculate the additional hospitaliza-
tion costs associated with treating smoking attributable to low-birth-
weight children. Using data from the 1994 Natality Detail data file, we
calculate there were 52,631 babies born weighing less than 2500 grams.
Maternal smoking increases the chance of having a baby in this weight
category by 49 percent/-s and given a smoking rate of 13.9 percent, we
To measure the effect of smoking on the risk of a low-weight birth, we run a logistic
regression where the outcome of interest is a binary indicator denoting whether a baby is
born with low weight. The covariate of interest equals 1 if the mother smoked during
pregnancy. For this analysis, we use the more than 3 million observations from the 1994
Natality Detail with valid responses to the smoking question. We also control for other
cofactors that have been shown to be correlated with the incidence of low-weight births,
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can attribute 6.35 percent of these births tosmoking. The marginal cost
of treating a child during its initial hospitalization is estimated to be
$72,408, so we calculate smoking is responsible for an additional $242
million in costs for treating very low-weight births.24 Using a similar
procedure, we calculate there is an additional $382 million spent on
treating smoking-induced births in the 1500-2499-gram birth-weight
category.
In the next line, we report estimates of the cost of educating children
enrolled in 1994 who were born weighing less than 2500 grams. Chai-
kind and Corman (1991) note that during the 1989/90 academic year, the
marginal cost of educating children in primary and secondary schools
who had low birth weight totaled $370 million (in 1990 dollars). Since
per-pupil education expenses increase by 20.2 percent from the 1989-
1990 to the 1994-1995 academic year, we inflate Chaikind and Corman's
estimates to $445.7 million. Since K-12 students in 1994 are aged 5-18,
these students were born in the years 1976-1989, when maternal smok-
ing rates were much higher. We use a rough estimate of 25 percent
smoking rates for these cohorts and a relative risk factor of 2.14. We
plurality of the birth, and state of birth. The exponent of this indicator on smoking, called
the odds ratio, is roughly equivalent to the relative risk ratio for infrequent events. We
estimate two models. First, we define a variable that equals 1 for births <1500 grams. The
sample mean of the dependent variable is 0.0127. The logit estimate (standard error) on the
smoking variable in this model is 0.397 (0.014), which translates into an odds ratio of 1.488.
In a second model, we define the dependent variable as 1 if the birth weight is less than
2500 grams. The sample mean of Y in this model is 0.0696, and the parameter (standard
error) on the smoking variable is 0.766 (0.006), which translates into an odds ratio of 2.145.
We need to convert these numbers into a relative risk for the 1500-2499-gram birth group.
The relative risk ratio for the <2500-gram group can be thought of as a weighted averageof
the risks for <1500 and for 1500-2499. Using the risks for <1500 and for<2500 and the
fraction of all low-weight births in the <1500-gram group, we calculate that the relative risk
ratio for the 1500-2499-gram birth-weight group is 2.293.
24 Data on the cost of treating low-birth-weight infants during their initial hospitalization
are taken from Health Care Cost and Utilization Project-3,National Inpatient Sample (NIS)
for 1994, http://www.ahcpr.gov.data/94drga.htm. The NIS is a data set that contains all
hospital discharge records from a 20-percent sample of U.S. community hospitals from17
states. The data base reports the number of discharges, the average lengthof stay, and the
average cost per discharge by Diagnosis Related Group (DRG).There are seven DRGs
(385-391) associated with newborns. The DRGs for very low, low, and normal birth weight
are 386, 387-388, and 389-391 respectively. DRG 385contains newborns who were trans-
ferred or who died in the hospital. Although this group would contain a number of low-
birth-weight infants, we delete them from the analysis. From the hospital discharge data,
we use average charges for infants with a DRG code of 386 asthe average cost of treating a
very low-weight infant (<1500 grams). A weighted averageof DRG 387 and 388 is used as
the average cost of treating infants weighing between 1500 and 2499 grams. The average
cost of treating a normal-weight infant is a weighted average of DRGs 389-391.The
marginal costs of treating very low- and low-birth-weight infants are the differences be-
tween the cost of treating them and normal-weight infants.50Evans, Ringel, & Stech
estimate that 22.22 percent of the costs associated with educating stu-
dents born with low birth weights can be attributed to smoking.
The largest external costs of smoking are associated with the deaths of
infants. There are three classes of deathswe investigate: deaths from
SIDS, non-SIDS-related infant mortality, and fetal loss. In eachcase, we
need to monetize the costs of death using value-of-statistical-life esti-
mates. Unfortunately, there is not much literature on the value of life for
infants and children. In a detailed review on the value-of-statistical-life
estimates generated from labor-market studies, Viscusi (1993) notes that
the bulk of the estimates are in the $4-7-million range, measured in 1990
dollars. We use this range of numbers, inflating the values to 1994
dollars.
Using data from the 1994 U.S. Vital Statistics, we calculate that there
were 31,710 infant deaths in the first year of life, of which 4,073 are
attributed to SIDS. Using the relative risk factor of 3 from DiFranza and
Lew (1995), we calculate a population attributed risk of 21.75 percent,
indicating maternal smoking was responsible for 886 SIDS cases in 1994.
For non-SIDS deaths, many of the deaths associated with smokingare
due to the higher death rates associated with low-weight births. Weuse
a relative risk factor for smoking of 1.20 for non-SIDS deaths (DiFranza
and Lew, 1995), indicating smoking is responsible for 748 infant deaths.
Although smoking increases the chance of fetal loss at all stages in the
pregnancy, it is difficult to know whether all pregnancies, had miscar-
riage not happened, would have been brought to term. Consequently,
we only consider late-term loss (stillbirths during the 28-40 weeks of
gestation) as external costs. Data from the U.S. Vital Statistics show
there were 14,663 late-term miscarriages, and using the relative risk of
1.2 from DiFranza and Lew, we attribute 397 of these to smoking.
Adding these costs together and using the ranges in the value of life
found in Viscusi (1993), we calculate the monetary cost of smoking-
related problems of infants and children in 1994 ranged from $9.9 billion
to $16.8 billion. Dividing this by the 23.3 billion packs of cigarettes sold
in fiscal year 1994, we estimate these costs amount to 42-72 cents/pack.
These numbers are much larger than the estimate in Manning et al.
(1991), because they use a much smaller value of the life estimate and
they do not consider deaths associated with SIDS.
At the other extreme, Hay (1991) estimates the costs associated with
maternal smoking are equal to $4.10/pack in 1990 dollars. Of themore
than $110 billion in external costs attributed to smoking in thiscase, Hay
estimates that $87 billion is due to reduced economic activity of children
whose mother's smoked during pregnancy. Hay bases this estimateon a
study that finds children whose mothers smoked are four months be-Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking51
hind other children in test scores at age 6. Hay likens this to a one-third
drop in years of education, which, at 6-percent rate of return, means a 2-
percent drop in economic value. Given the developmental and behav-
ioral problems of many low-birth-weight children, we have no doubt
that maternal smoking does reduce future earnings of many children.
We question whether one can treat being four months behind in test
scores as being equal to losing one-third of a year's education. Thus, we
wifi conclude that our estimates in Table 9 are low, but we make no
further calculation.
The results in Manning et al. (1991) and Viscusi (1993) sidestep the
difficult issue of whether costs associated with maternal smoking or
second-hand smoke should be considered external. In that work, these
costs did not change the authors' conclusion that smokers pay their way.
Our results, however, make the question more pertinent in that the addi-
tion of only the costs associated with maternal smoking are substantial.
8. CONCLUSION
Academic work on the economics of tobacco consumption and control
has evolved to the point where it can be called an industry. Chaloupka
and Warner in their 1998 working paper "The Economics of Smoking"
give 23 single-spaced pages of references, mostly written by economists.
This research has been featured prominently in debates concerning the
likely effects of major tobacco control policies. Some of the interest in this
general area of research has diminished in recent months, as both the
Settlement and the McCain bill died in Congress. The drop in interest
wifi however be short-lived, because we have probably not seen the last
of proposals for major hikes in cigarette taxes. At the time of this writing,
representatives from eight states and three tobacco companies are dis-
cussing a limited version of the Settlement that would eventually raise
cigarette prices by about 30 cents per pack. In recent years, large state tax
hikes have raised the tax to $1.00/pack in Alaska and Hawaii, $0.825/pack
in Washington, and $0.75/pack in Michigan. In Maryland, a number of
candidates for state office have made a state tax hike of $1.50/pack part of
their campaign platform. Subsequently, we should have new rounds of
debates about the likely impacts of higher cigarette excise taxes.
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